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COMMENTARY
Oppositional 
mentalities
Intellectuals, protest and the Left
Martin Ryle
‘The “oppositional” mentality of the British Left ,ʼ wrote E.P. Thompson in 1965, ʻis certainly a limiting outlook; but it has grown up simply because our Left has had so bloody much to oppose … The British Left … has been 
immersed in ineluctable political contexts characteristic of the metropolitan imperialist 
power.ʼ  Since 1960 it has been in protests against the compliance of governments in 
US/NATO military strategies that the British Left has seemed most vital. It has been 
able at such times to mobilize tens of thousands of ordinarily quiescent citizens, to 
bring together socialists in and beyond the labour movement, and to subject the Labour 
Party sʼ centre-right leadership to its most testing challenges. The pan-European mobiliz-
ation against the deployment of new nuclear missiles in the early 1980s (in which 
Thompson played a crucial part) marked this Left sʼ moment of greatest dynamism. 
Protests against New Labour sʼ support for military action in the Gulf, Kosovo/Serbia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq have continued to draw together radical opponents of New 
Labour, and it is tempting for those involved to see this as a movement within which 
Left politics might reinvent itself.
Protest coalitions, however, are in principle united only by what they oppose. 
Demonstrating against the US-led attack on Afghanistan and against the likely future 
extension of the ʻwar against terror ,ʼ I have been very conscious of this political 
limitation. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which has played an important 
organizing role, unites a spectrum of Left-liberal opinion that straddles the borders 
of the Labour Party, but has been unable to create a new party with a broader Left 
agenda. The alliance between CND and the national Stop the War Coalition (where the 
Socialist Workersʼ Party has been the leading inﬂuence) indicates the range of positions 
within antiwar protest – from paciﬁsm via radical ecology to those who would offer 
more or less qualiﬁed support to any state or organization that attacks or is attacked by 
the USA – and it signals the tactical choice to obscure these differences in the interests 
of a certain unity.
Protest can be said to have a wider dynamic, leading in ʻan anti-imperialist direc-
tionʼ (the phrase appears in the concluding sentence of Andrew Chitty sʼ contribution to 
the Radical Philosophy discussion on 11 September and its aftermath, RP 111, p. 19). 
This is certainly where the ʻoppositionalʼ logic of the movement tends; and there is no 
doubt that we are likely to ﬁnd ourselves opposing new US wars and British compli-
ance in them. However, anti-imperialism is itself deﬁned negatively, oppositionally. 
It may be construed as enjoining allegiances that many on the Left ﬁnd untenable: 
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ʻpositive defenceʼ of the Taliban and Bin Laden, for example; or, in an earlier setting, 
the defence of Soviet-style socialism. The problem is not only with the particular 
allegiances proposed, but with the underlying Manichaean world-view. Global capital-
ism/neo-imperialism is seen as so bad that anything opposed to it must be better, in a 
world where there are always and only two sides between which we must choose. To 
orient one sʼ politics around this belief is to repress some unpalatable truths. First of 
all, now as during the Cold War, the countries where ʻmetropolitan imperialist powerʼ 
originated and whose military alliances defend the interests of capital are also countries 
whose citizens enjoy historically unprecedented political and civil freedoms, unknown 
in much of the world. For these freedoms the ʻenemies of freedom ,ʼ in the Politburo 
or the Taliban, have indeed shown no respect: which means that the choice between 
these opposed forces is a choice between different kinds of evil, to be rejected in itself. 
(Moreover, the opposition, if pursued as a military confrontation, can lead only to 
bloody US victories, perhaps eventually followed by cataclysmic ruin of the contending 
parties.) Second, the socialist alternatives that have been proposed have seemed less 
and less capable of winning support within liberal democracies, where capitalist priori-
ties might still be challenged by political means.
In this context, the self-constitution of protest coalitions as broad alliances, agreeing 
to differ on underlying perspectives, is an agreement to evade the political question: 
what alternative do we envisage to the status quo? This applies not just to antiwar coa-
litions, but to protests against globalization or capitalism. The ʻanticapitalist movementʼ 
is a welcome cultural sign of resistance, but politically it represents a regression from 
a time when substantive alternatives to free-market capitalism were being discussed 
and negotiated in Left social-democratic parties and governments. With the new social 
movements generally, the question is whether the different interests and perspectives 
involved can move from a relatively comfortable – but marginal, reactive and depend-
ent – ʻprotest identityʼ to a ʻproject identity .ʼ This step would involve accommodation 
between very different aims and interests (those, say, of the automobile workers 
defending their jobs on the streets of Seattle, as well as those of the environmentalists 
demonstrating there against oil prospecting), but it is just here that a credible alternative 
politics must begin. As it is, one starts to sense an element of ritual in these repeated 
demos outside World Trade Organization or G8 meetings, which begin to look a bit 
like the old trek from Aldermaston. The antiwar coalition, too, has spent much energy 
exhorting people to attend demonstrations: there were four Hyde Park-to-Trafalgar 
Square marches in the six-month period to Easter 2002. Yet everyone knows these 
marches are not going to stop the war or topple ʻBush and Blair .ʼ Since the prospects 
of intervening effectively against British compliance in American war plans depend on 
whether the Left here can mount a long-term political challenge to the hegemony of 
New Labour, this is a moment when underlying questions need to be addressed rather 
than suppressed.
What is left?
To reﬂect on what might still deﬁne the Left in positive terms, and on the nature of an 
eventually counter-hegemonic politics, is one way of responding to Susan Buck-Morss sʼ 
suggestion that following last autumn sʼ terrorist attacks, intellectuals as ʻpart of the 
thinking organʼ of the global body politic may need to speak in new ways (RP 111, 
p. 2). Sub- or counter-cultural movements provide engaged intellectuals with points 
of departure and networks of solidarity, and we still have a critical (ʻoppositionalʼ) 
intelligentsia. However, it is difﬁcult to write with conﬁdence of the wider progressive 
political project within which most of us want to locate our thinking. I do not mean just 
that the Left has been pushed to the margins; I mean that we no longer know, or agree 
on, what the Left is – in other than ʻoppositionalʼ terms.
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Such reﬂection involves a return to old questions rather than an opening of radi-
cally new prospects. It drives one back to an assessment of the defeats, and unrealized 
openings, of the 1980s. That decade, which saw the apogee of an oppositional European 
Left in the antinuclear movement, also marked the eclipse of the forms in which 
socialist ideas in twentieth-century Europe had had their most effective incarnations. 
In Britain, the legitimacy of strike action as a means of asserting workersʼ interests 
was dealt a lasting blow with the defeat of the miners and subsequent Tory election 
victories. The apparatus of the Communist state began to collapse across the Soviet 
bloc: few wept at its demise, but many in the West were dismayed when no one tried 
to build in the ruins a post-Communist alternative, democratic but still socialist. The 
Labour Party began a mutation, paralleled elsewhere in Europe, which would allow its 
leaders to jettison much of the language and almost all of the mildly interventionist, 
mildly egalitarian economic policies that used to distinguish the parliamentary Left. 
Meanwhile, new social constituencies and new global 
themes (questions of gender and patriarchy; of ʻrace ,ʼ 
migration and citizenship; of ecology, sustainability 
and the inequalities between First and Third World 
workers) underlined the limitations of European 
social-democratic programmes. This foreshadowed the 
possibility of conceiving socialism differently, as a 
ʻpolitics of need .ʼ However, it was evident that such a 
politics would conﬂict with many inherited priorities 
of social democracy sʼ traditional, but in fact rapidly 
dissolving, social base.
In his contribution to a collection of essays pub-
lished in 1981 (Martin Jacques and Francis Mulhern, 
eds, The Forward March of Labour Halted?), 
Raymond Williams acknowledged these latter pressures 
and questioned, more generally, whether the labour 
movement might still in good faith make its historic 
claim to represent the general interest. He objected to 
the ﬁgure of the ʻforward march of labourʼ as obscur-
ing the fact that the Left faced not an obstacle in its 
foreordained path but a crisis in its historical direction. 
Today, socialism as Thompson or Williams understood 
it is at the outer margins of political power in European 
societies. Some would add that the political and cultural efﬁcacy of the socialist idea 
(conceived in its broadest terms, as the idea of an equal society in which collective 
political decisions would have priority over the mechanisms of the market) has been 
terminated also.
This is familiar. The difﬁculty is to distinguish, in responding, between long-term 
historical changes and conjunctural shifts. The drawing of such distinctions is itself a 
statement of one sʼ political judgement and position. Let me set out schematically my 
own response. The revolutionary Marxist tradition, in European liberal democracies, 
is dead and should be decently buried. But the rightward swing of social-democratic 
parties, in line with their leadersʼ sense of how best to adjust to economic circum-
stances, can be resisted. It is politically possible, on the basis of eco-social democratic 
interventions (within a still operating capitalism, but with an explicitly counter-systemic 
orientation), to create the social, cultural and intellectual basis for an eventually post-
capitalist economy.
This judgement reﬂects the now generally forgotten arguments of those thinkers 
(Williams, or Lucio Magri, or Laclau and Mouffe, for instance) who during the ﬂuid, 
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activist moment of the 1980s sought in various registers to renew rather than abandon 
the ideals of democratic socialism.1 I see there – much more convincingly than in Hardt 
and Negri sʼ Empire, whose enthusiastic reception by some inﬂuential intellectuals on 
the Left I ﬁnd difﬁcult to understand – an attempt to combine argument about the 
content of a renewed socialist project with argument about which kinds of agency, or 
collectivity, might promote it. Some may see my reference to the socialist humanism 
of Williams and Thompson, and more generally to the activism of the 1980s, as a 
desperate turn to the past. But 1980 is not so remote as 1917. If we date the history of 
the socialist idea from the mid-nineteenth century, and accept that the end of the Cold 
War marked a critical alteration in its prospects, then the dozen years since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall may be regarded as a phase of readjustment and need not be seen as the 
end of the story.
I am arguing, in a word, that while the end of the Cold War need not and should not 
be seen as sealing the triumph of capitalism over socialism, it can and should be seen 
as marking the moment where pluralist, social-democratic politics sealed a historical 
victory over all the varieties of communism. A Left intelligentsia in the West which 
tended to identify itself by its rejection of social democracy has therefore to come to 
terms with a series of political truths, including the following:
1. The notion that the socialist future is inscribed in history, as the necessary conse-
quence of the necessary collapse of capitalism, has been worse than unhelpful.
2. The ʻsubject of historyʼ or ʻrevolutionary subjectʼ cannot be conceived in terms of a 
single class with a set of non-contradictory needs.
3. The economic project of socialism cannot be understood as the fuller satisfaction 
of the material needs, in their existing forms, of afﬂuent workers (or, of course, of 
well-to-do professionals) in the West.
4. The notion of a single deﬁning moment of revolutionary transformation followed 
by the once-for-all installation of socialist government is untenable: on democratic 
grounds, since any socialist society would continue to be subject to conﬂicts of 
interest and value requiring political representation; and because the complex 
material–social basis of contemporary life, including the division of labour which 
underlies both production and administration, cannot be ʻoverthrown ,ʼ it can only be 
changed.
Some will say that anyone who argues such views has abandoned socialism. I suggested 
earlier that it was difﬁcult to know what kind of agreement there might be as to what 
socialism constitutes now, and my uncertainty concerns exactly this question. Do most 
intellectuals who still regard themselves as socialists mean by this that their allegiance 
is to some such revolutionary politics?
In my own view, socialism does not involve adherence to those conceptions of the 
agency, means and nature of political change. Nothing that has happened in the twenti-
eth century need lead us to reject what I take to be the fundamental idea of socialism: 
that it is possible, and necessary, to ﬁnd democratic means of controlling economic 
activity, and of directing this towards the meeting of collectively agreed needs. On the 
contrary, indeed. One old slogan seems as persuasive as ever: socialism or barbarism.
As Williams saw, the absolutely central question for socialism concerned the readi-
ness of the movement to become no longer the agent of an existing historically deﬁned 
set of material interests, but the movement within which ʻthe concept of a practical and 
possible general interest, which really does include all reasonable particular interests, 
and necessarily on a much wider than British scale, has to be negotiated, found, agreed, 
constructed .ʼ The Labour Party in the mid-1980s shunned the electoral risks of engaging 
with the new social movements and of the internationalist and environmental sensibility 
which these sought to express. Its leadership since 1997 (almost wholly unopposed by 
its parliamentarians) has acknowledged such questions only in ʻaspirationalʼ rhetoric: 
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not without cultural-political signiﬁcance, but complemented in practice by undeviat-
ing commitment to the status quo. Generally, and very strikingly, New Labour is the 
agent precisely of a reversal of social democracy sʼ historical project, and seeks with 
missionary zeal to extend the sphere within which a politics of collectively articulated 
needs and values must yield to the market. However, the unacceptability of this project 
to both the labour movement and the environmental and internationalist constituency is 
more and more evident.
Nonetheless, we live for now under New Labour with what Kate Soper has called ʻa 
politics of the suppression of the politics of needs .ʼ What we are suppressing includes 
the unmet needs of the poor; anyone sʼ need for anything that conﬂicts with the one-
dimensional ʻcultureʼ of productivism; and the knowledge that the First World structure 
of consumption is unsustainable as a basis for humanity sʼ future needs. Suppression is 
suppression: there are many indications that we are aware of what we deny. But these 
have been largely inchoate and sub-political. To make them explicit deﬁnes the starting 
point, intellectually and ideologically, for what socialism might still be.
Allegiance to this perspective is for the moment allegiance to an idea, although 
it certainly does not rule out, and in fact depends on and expresses, solidarities with 
particular social groups. It is, more precisely, allegiance to an intellectual and cultural 
project. The idea of ʻa practical and possible general interestʼ remains to be more fully 
developed, and to be mobilized in the development of new political forces. I judge that 
these now ought to include an electoral alliance or party that would bring together pro-
gressive social democrats who are separately and variously powerless in their present 
organizations: Greens, dissident members of New Labour and the Liberal Democrats, 
unafﬁliated radicals. Left intellectuals can contribute to the necessary political argu-
ment and organization, in a time whose dangers require us to move beyond the familiar 
responses of the ʻoppositional mentality .ʼ
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